Makin v QBE: A condition precedent remains a free spirit that won’t be confined to a label

11 June 2025 by Rachel Auld and John Curran

When it comes to determining whether a notification term is a condition precedent, the tin doesn’t necessarily need to be labelled as such, but its contents must be very clearly identifiable.

Insights/Makin v QBE: A condition precedent remains a free spirit that won’t be confined to a label
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Makin v QBE: A condition precedent remains a free spirit that won’t be confined to a label

In a judgment handed down on 11 April 2025, the High Court determined that notification provisions in a public liability policy were conditions precedent to insurers’ liability and offered obiter dicta on the types of judgments that are capable of establishing liability for the purposes of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 in England & Wales.

Background

Mr Makin attended the Muse Bar and Restaurant in Oldham with his friends on the evening of 6 August 2017. He was in “high spirits” when, shortly after 8.30pm, he threw a glass on the floor and was ejected from the premises by the door supervisors. Outside the premises there was an altercation. In the course of this, one of the door supervisors forced Mr Makin to the ground and held him in a headlock.

After the incident, Mr Makin got up and walked away, taking a taxi home. Two days later his mother went to visit him because he hadn’t been in contact and found that he had suffered a stroke.

Proceedings

Mr Makin was left with serious neurological disability as a result of the stroke and has significant care needs. His mother brought the proceedings on his behalf.

Mr Makin’s case was that the stroke was caused by the headlock. He brought a claim for damages against (i) the operator of the restaurant, and (ii) the security company that employed the door supervisors (“Protec”). The claim against the restaurant was discontinued, leaving Protec as the sole defendant.

A preliminary issue trial took place in July 2023, but Protec didn’t attend (joint liquidators having been appointed for it the preceding day). At the trial it was established that Mr Makin had suffered the stroke and consequent injury as a result of an assault by the door supervisor that put him in a headlock, and that Protec was vicariously liable. Judgment was entered for Mr Makin, with damages to be assessed.

2010 Act claim

In January 2024, QBE, Protec’s public liability insurer at the time of the incident, was joined to the action pursuant to the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”) on the basis that Protec was liable to Mr Makin, and that liability was insured under a contract of insurance with QBE (the “Policy”).

QBE denied liability to indemnify Protec (and therefore any liability to Mr Makin) on the grounds of late notification which, they argued, was a breach of a condition precedent in the policy.

Issues for the court

There were four issues for the court:

  1. Was Protec in breach of the claims conditions under the Policy?
  2. If so, were insurers entitled to refuse cover as of right for breach of a condition precedent or were they limited to exercising a discretion to refuse cover?
  3. If the latter, did insurers exercise their discretion to decline cover lawfully?
  4. Was the July 2023 judgment against Protec binding on insurers?

Issue 1: Was there a breach of the claims conditions?

The relevant claims conditions under the Policy were conditions 2 and 3.5:

CLAIMS CONDITIONS

The following Conditions 1-10 must be complied with after an incident that may give rise to a claim under your policy. Breach of these conditions will entitle us to refuse to deal with the relevant claim.

.…
2 Writ, summons, etc
You must not respond to any letter, writ or summons or other document sent to you in connection with any accident, incident or occurrence that may relate to any claim under your policy or which may give rise to a claim under any Section of your policy. You must immediately send them to Sutton Specialist Risks Ltd unanswered by return of post, or to us or legal representatives as may otherwise be advised by us.

3 Notification of claims
You or any other party insured by your policy must inform Sutton Specialist Risks Ltd:

3.1 immediately you have knowledge of any impending prosecution, inquest or inquiry in connection with any accident or disease, which may be the subject of claim, give notice in writing and give us any further information and assistance we may require,
…

3.5 within as soon as practical but in any event within thirty (30) days in the case of any other damage, bodily injury, incident, accident or occurrence, that may give rise to a claim under any your policy but not specified separate above.

At the time of the incident on 6 August 2017, the sole director of Protec was on leave. An incident form was created, signed by the door supervisor who put Mr Makin the headlock, and his manager, but it was undated. On 8 August 2017 Mr Makin’s mother found him unwell and he was admitted to hospital. Four days later, she spoke to the police about the incident. During August and September 2017 the police investigated the incident and interviewed both door supervisors. At some point during the police investigation, Protec’s director came back from leave.

A Letter of Claim dated 29 October 2019 was issued on Mr Makin’s behalf to the restaurant. On 29 December 2019, the restaurant provided a scanned copy of the Letter of Claim to Protec, confirming that they had been advised to provide a copy to them and ask that Protec pass a copy to their insurers.

Six months later, a Letter of Claim dated 5 June 2020 was issued to Protec on Mr Makin’s behalf. On 8 June 2020, Mr Makin’s solicitors passed it to Protec’s insurers. This was the first time that insurers were made aware of the incident.

In relation to claims condition 3.5, the court found that at the time of the incident no reasonable insured could be expected to have formed the view that there were circumstances that “may give rise to a claim” under the Policy given that Mr Makin got up and walked away. However, once Protec’s director was aware that his employees were going to be interviewed by the police and were potentially being criticised for injuring a customer, failing to notify insurers at that point was a breach of claims condition 3.5.

Having found against Mr Makin on claims condition 3.5, claims condition 2 didn’t affect the outcome, but the judge dealt with it nonetheless. Mr Makin sought to argue that the wording of the provision was ambiguous. For example, it wasn’t clear exactly to what letters, writs, summons or other documents the provision related. A letter itself could not give rise to a claim under the policy – only the underlying accident, etc. Also, it was difficult to conceive of an accident, incident or occurrence that relates to a claim under the policy. It is only an accident, etc. which might itself give rise to a claim to which the policy might respond that would be of interest to insurers.

In view of this ambiguity, Mr Makin submitted, the court should apply the contra proferentem rule, which was stated by Roche J in Simmonds v Cockell[1] as being “that if the language of a warranty in a policy is ambiguous, it must be construed against the underwriter who has drawn the policy and who has inserted the warranty for his own protection”.

However, the court found that the wording of claims condition 2 was capable of being construed in a way that made sense. It held that the contra proferentem rule will only be applied where the wording of a clause is so ambiguous as to be incapable of meaning. Where there is no ambiguity, there is no role for the application of the contra proferentem rule.[2]

Alternatively, Mr Makin argued that there was no breach of claims condition 2 because:

  • As regards the Letter of Claim against the restaurant, that did not demonstrate an intention to make a claim against Protec; and
  • As regards the Letter of Claim against Protec, that was received by Protec shortly after 5 June 2020 and was sent by Mr Makin’s solicitors to insurers on 8 July 2020, which was sufficiently speedy to amount to “immediate” transmission of the letter, as required by claims condition 2.

However, the court found that there was a breach of claims condition 2. It was clear that a claim might be advanced against Protec when Protec was passed the Letter of Claim against the restaurant and asked to pass the letter to its insurers.

In relation to the Letter of Claim against Protec, the court accepted that if a party fails to provide a letter to an insurer in circumstances where the insurer already has a copy of the letter, a court might be reluctant to find a contractual breach. However, it left the point for consideration in a case where it affected the result.

Issue 2: What was the effect of the breach?

On issue 2, the court found that compliance with the claims conditions was a condition precedent to insurers’ liability under the Policy and so Protec’s non-compliance entitled insurers to refuse indemnity under the Policy.

As HHJ Richard Pearce put it, the contents of the tin were capable of being construed as conditions precedent, even if the label “condition precedent” was not there. In other words, the Policy didn’t state specifically that the claims conditions were conditions precedent to insurers’ liability (and, the term “condition precedent” was used within other clauses in the Policy, but not in relation to the claims conditions), but it did spell out that breach of the claims conditions would entitle insurers to refuse to deal with the claim, and this was clear enough.

Issue 3: Did insurers exercise any discretion to decline cover lawfully?  

In view of the court’s determination on issue 2, consideration of issue 3 was purely academic.

Issue 4: What is the effect of the July 2023 judgment?

The court held that but for its findings on coverage (issues 1 and 2), the July 2023 judgment against Protec would have been binding on insurers in the same manner in which it is binding on Protec.

Whilst not a binding authority on the English courts, the court found the decision in the case of Scotland Gas Networks plc v QBE UK Ltd[3] of “considerable persuasive value” in reaching this decision. In that case, Scotland Gas sued a quarry operator for damage to a gas pipeline. The quarry operator entered liquidation and was later dissolved. When it didn’t appear at the trial, Scotland Gas obtained a decree in default against it, which it then sought to enforce against the quarry operator’s insurers, QBE, under the 2010 Act.

The Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland addressed a key issue under the 2010 Act: what constitutes sufficient proof of liability when the insured defendant is insolvent? Insurers argued that a decree in default was not sufficient to establish the quarry operator’s liability for the purposes of the 2010 Act and that insurers should be allowed to “look behind” the decree in default to assess whether the quarry operator was truly liable. However, the Inner House held that a decree in default was sufficient. Allowing insurers to re-litigate liability would undermine the purpose of the 2010 Act – to protect third parties from the consequences of an insured defendant’s insolvency.

Whilst the court’s comments on issue 4 were obiter, they show that if a judgment on liability is secured against an insolvent insured, and there is a successful third party challenge to coverage, insurers will find themselves liable in respect of the judgment without being able to challenge the decision on liability.

Likewise, a judgment on liability against an insured that becomes insolvent after the judgment is obtained against it is binding on insurers facing a third party claim under the 2010 Act. In such situations, though, insurers might be able to rely on a breach of the policy terms (for example the insured allowing default judgment to be entered against it) in its defence of the third party claim.

This can be distinguished from a situation where there is a judgment against a solvent insured. In those circumstances, insurers are entitled to dispute or challenge the finding of liability against the insured (provided they were not a party to the proceedings and had not agreed to be bound by them) and can require the insured to formally prove both the liability to the third party and that such liability is covered under the policy.

Comment

Permission to appeal has been granted in relation to the finding that the claims conditions were conditions precedent.

As was highlighted in the case of Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd,[4] in determining whether a clause requiring notification of a claim is a condition precedent, the policy must be construed as a whole. The absence of explicit language labelling a clause as a “condition precedent” does not preclude it from being construed as such. However, clauses exempting a party from liability will usually require very clear drafting to permit reliance upon them.[5]

Similarly, as was noted in the Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd v Mccullough case,[6] the courts recognise that there is a clear commercial purpose behind clauses requiring the notification of circumstances: to allow the insurer to investigate the potential claim in a timely way. However, they must be clearly and unambiguously expressed to be conditions precedent to be enforceable as such, and will be strictly construed.

Ultimately, when it comes to determining whether a notification term is a condition precedent, the tin doesn’t necessarily need to be labelled as such, but its contents must be very clearly identifiable.

[1] [1920] 1 KB 843 at para 845

[2] See the judgment of the Divisional Court in Financial Conduct Authority v Arch [2020] EWHC 2448

[3] [2024] CSIH 36

[4] [1995] CLC 180 at para 203

[5] Chitty 18-008 (35th Ed)

[6] Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd v Mccullough [2021] EWHC 2798 (Comm) at para 16

A copy of the Court’s decision can be found here.